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PROTECTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN INDIAN
COUNTRY THROUGH ELECTION MONITORING: A
SOLUTION TO TRIBAL ELECTION DISPUTES
Derek H. Ross*
L Introduction
Elections in America are prone to controversy. Each election cycle, it is
common to see disputes litigated for weeks after the initial votes have been
counted These controversies occur in all levels of elections, including
those for state and local governments.2 The media report extensively on
these disputes. There is also a large amount of academic literature
discussing the causes of and proposed solutions to these election problems,
particularly since Bush v. Gore.3 Because of the heightened levels of media
and academic attention, many states adopted procedures aimed at
preventing disruptions to the election process.4 At the federal level,
Congress passed the Help America Vote Act,5 "which encourages states to
update their voting systems, standardize their voting registration
requirements, and otherwise improve their election processes."6 While no
system can ever be perfect, governments are at least attempting to find
solutions for many of the most frequent problems.
American Indian tribal elections experience similar controversies. Each
year, dozens of tribal election disputes are litigated in both tribal and
federal courts. Some of this litigation lasts many years.' Unlike national
and state elections, very little scholarship has been dedicated to finding
solutions to tribal election issues. Several factors likely contribute to this
lack of scholarship, including the relatively low number of participants in
these elections, scant media coverage outside of Indian news publications,
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); Franken v. Pawlenty, 762 N.W.2d 558
(Minn. 2009).
2. See generally Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis ofState and Federal Remedies for Election
Fraud: Learning From Florida's Presidential Election Debacle, 63 U. PITr. L. REV. 159
(2001).
3. Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 265, 266
(2007) [hereinafter Huefner, Election Wrongs].
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
6. Huefner, Election Wrongs, supra note 3, at 265.
7. See generally Seminole Nation of Okla. v. Norton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C.
2002).
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and barriers to obtaining election information. Nevertheless, these
elections, and the cases stemming from them, deserve both academic and
public attention because their outcomes determine who will govern tribe
members throughout the United States. Furthermore, the allocation and
control of millions of dollars of federal and tribal funds can depend on the
election disputes' outcomes.
Problem-solvers should investigate procedural solutions to tribal election
disputes because election controversies lead to distrust and allegations of
illegitimacy from inside and outside of the tribes. Legitimate governments
"encourage[] citizens to feel secure in investing in the future of the
community. At the same time .. . [they] inspire confidence in outsiders
who interact with tribes through social, commercial, and legal dealings."
When governments are put in place following litigation, both tribal
members and outsiders doubt the government's legitimacy.9 Despite the
importance of preventing these controversies, present remedies to tribal
election disputes are insufficient. As one court lamented:
The Court would like to believe that its decision will resolve, or
at least be a positive step toward resolving the long-existing
turmoil and contention that exists between the parties .... This,
the Court fears, will not be the result. Rather, the Court is
confident that, no matter what it decides, or for that matter what
the Circuit Court may ultimately decide since it is inevitable that
this case will be appealed, that internal rifts within [the tribe] and
friction between the [tribe] and the [Department of the Interior]
will continue. Nonetheless, despite this pessimism, the Court
must try to fashion a remedy that addresses the dispute before
it .... o
This comment considers election procedures, both in the United States
and abroad, and attempts to find solutions to election controversies that can
be applied to tribal election systems. First, it details the history of tribal
elections and the roles that tribal courts, federal courts, and the Department
of the Interior (DOI) play in resolving election disputes. The discussion
will also include what remedies, if any, are available to the tribes to resolve
these disputes.
8. Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1049, 1064
(2007).
9. Id.




Next, this comment examines the remedies suggested for state and local
governments to mitigate the increased attention resulting from the 2000
presidential election and the cases following it. Further, it looks at tribal
election procedures to determine whether the suggestions for state and local
government elections can be applied to tribal elections. The benefits of any
possible solutions must always be balanced with tribal sovereignty and
notions of self-governance.
This comment devotes a significant amount of attention to the 2011
Cherokee Nation Principal Chief election. This election controversy
provides a good example of the typical problems that can arise in tribal
elections. It also represents one of the few instances when a
nongovernmental organization has been invited to observe a tribal election.
Finally, this comment suggests the best solution for tribal election
disputes: creating an intergovernmental organization tasked with
monitoring tribal elections. Member tribes could send representatives to act
as election monitors for other tribes that opt into the organization. Similar
organizations already exist for the purpose of monitoring and validating
elections all over the world, and a tribal system could be modeled after
these entities. This organization would provide much-needed transparency
and legitimacy to tribal elections.
II. The Sources of Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Governance
"Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were self-governing
sovereign political communities."" Sovereignty is an important part of any
electoral process. Sovereignty includes the ability to decide how the
government will be chosen and how disputes regarding the selection of
government leaders will be settled. Before discussing remedies available to
tribes, one must appreciate the nature of the powers that tribes possess.
Although tribes are sovereign nations, they do not possess all of the
traditional powers of a sovereign. Instead, tribes have limited powers that
have developed through treaties, executive orders, legislation, and court
decisions since the "discovery" of America. Because of this quasi-
sovereign status, the federal government can only step in and help to
resolve election disputes in limited circumstances. This concept of tribes as
domestic dependent nations developed through a line of cases known as the
Marshall Trilogy.12 Despite Justice John Marshall's opinions regarding the
11. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
12. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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extinguishment of aboriginal rights and diminished tribal sovereignty, tribes
remain "a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations."' 3
"The Marshall Trilogy remains important because it forms a historical
starting point in understanding the diminished nature of inherent tribal
sovereignty."14 In Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Supreme Court held that per
the doctrine of discovery, only the discovering sovereign can acquire title to
newly discovered lands.' 5 This meant that tribes could not sell their land to
individuals, but instead only to the government of the discovering nation.16
After the United States declared independence from Britain, the right of
purchase transferred to the United States federal government and not to the
individual colonies or states.17  This limitation on the tribal lands'
alienability imposed concomitant restrictions on tribal self-governance
upon which Justice Marshall would expand in the subsequent cases.
The next case in the trilogy, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, established the
trust doctrine, outlining the guardian-ward relationship between the United
States and the tribes.'9 Justice Marshall wrote that tribes "look to our
government for protection[,] rely upon its kindness and its power[,] appeal
to it for relief to their wants[,] and address the President as their great
father."20 Instead of foreign nations, Justice Marshall characterized tribes
as "domestic dependent nations," having lost many of their sovereign rights
as a result of conquest and discovery.21 "[T]he Court held that Indians
retained tribal sovereignty but that Congress could limit such sovereignty
by the simple reality of the tribes' dependent relationship with the
American state." 22
13. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886).
14. Paul W. Shagen, Safeguarding The Integrity of Tribal Elections Through Campaign
Finance Regulation, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 103, 109 (2009).
15. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 544-45.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources
Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REv. 713, 739 (2004).
19. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831).
20. Id.
2 1. Id.
22. Anthony G. Gulig & Sidney L. Harring, "An Indian Cannot Get A Morsel of
Pork . ... "A Retrospective on Crow Dog, Lone Wolf, Blackbird, Tribal Sovereignty, Indian




Worcester v. Georgia established that tribal sovereignty and federal
supremacy preempted any state laws purporting to regulate Indian affairs.
Georgia passed laws restricting who could be present on Cherokee lands.
The Court held that Georgia could not pass laws regulating Indian lands,
and that the Constitution reserved to the federal government the power to
interact with Indian nations.
Courts expanded upon this concept of tribal sovereignty in the 200 years
since the Marshall Trilogy. Tribes can establish and exercise their own
laws in Indian Country,25 although Congress retains plenary power over the
tribes due to the tribes' dependent nature. Further, "Congress . . . has a
right to determine for itself when the guardianship . . . shall cease[,]" 2 7
unrestricted by judicial oversight or treaty provisions. States, however,
generally do not have power over Indians in Indian Country. "Congress
has . . . acted consistently upon the assumption that the States have no
power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation."29
A. Indian Reorganization Act
The Marshall Trilogy establishes the relationship between the tribes and
the federal and state governments, but the cases do not touch on whether the
tribes' limited sovereignty includes the power to choose forms of
governments or government officials. Congressional intent regarding this
issue can be found in the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).30 Indeed, "[t]he
overriding purpose of [the IRA] was to establish machinery whereby Indian
tribes would be able to assume a greater degree of self-government, both
politically and economically." 31
Under the IRA, tribes can, with the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, adopt a constitution, elect officials, and institute other bylaws for
the benefit of the tribe.32 The IRA shows a federal Indian policy "in favor
of tribal self-determination and strong tribal government." 33
23. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536 (1832).
24. Id at 520.
25. See generally Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
26. See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
27. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
28. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
29. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
30. Indian Reorganization Act § 16, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2006)).
31. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974).
32. Noreen C. Lennon, Department ofInterior Authorized to Review "Final" Decisions
of Tribal Election Board and to Invalidate Tribal Election Based on Eligibility Disputes in
No. 2] 427
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The Secretary of the Interior has also established procedures for
challenging elections. These procedures state that
[a]ny qualified voter, within three days following the posting of
the results of an election, may challenge the election results by
filing with the Secretary through the officer in charge the
grounds for the challenge, together with substantiating evidence.
If in the opinion of the Secretary, the objections are valid and
warrant a recount or new election, the Secretary shall order a
recount or a new election. The results of the recount or new
election shall be final.34
But this statute stops far short of explaining exactly what can happen when
challenges to tribal elections enter federal courts. The effect of a challenge
in federal court can only be found in case law, which will be discussed in
Section III.
B. Indian Civil Rights Act
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)35 introduced further limitations on
tribal power. Passed in 1968, ICRA statutorily imposes on Indian tribes
many of the limitations the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment
impose on the federal and state governments. 36 "The express purpose of
this legislation is to 'protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust
actions of tribal governments' by placing 'limitations on an Indian tribe in
the exercise of its powers of self-government."' 37 Congress's authority to
pass laws restricting tribal sovereignty stems from the Commerce Clause
and the Supreme Court's determination in the Marshall Trilogy that tribes
are domestic dependent nations.
Remedies for ICRA violations are not necessarily available in federal
courts. "Before [the] 1978 United States Supreme Court decision in Santa
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux (Dakota) Community v. Babbitt, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 527,
562-63 (1998).
33. Id. at 527.
34. 25 C.F.R. § 81.22 (2011).
35. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006).
36. Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law
Perspective on Congressional Authority to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L.
REv. 65, 85 (1990).
37. Id. at 85-86.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("[Congress shall have Power] [t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."); see also




Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,3 9 lower federal courts occasionally entertained
actions to review the merits of tribal election disputes under ICRA."4 0 In
Martinez, the Court established that to avoid interfering with tribal self-
governance and sovereignty, habeas corpus is the only available federal
court remedy for ICRA violations.4 1
III. Existing Remedies to Election Disputes
A. Remedies in Federal Courts
Federal court remedies available for tribal election disputes depend on
the type of election in dispute. Two types of elections occur in Indian
Country.42 First, general tribal elections determine positions within the
government and establish tribal laws.43 Second, secretarial elections occur
when "the Secretary of the Interior conducts occasional elections under the
Indian Reorganization Act for specific purposes governed by that act and its
implementing regulations."" The only way to amend tribal constitutions
adopted under the IRA is through a secretarial election.45 Additionally,
some tribal constitutions require tribes to hold secretarial elections for
certain elections beyond those required by the IRA.4 6  In secretarial
elections, "federal involvement is the norm, rather than the exception.
Secretarial elections are considered federal instead of tribal elections, and
are therefore governed by federal instead of tribal law.48 As such, relief
from secretarial election disputes is found in federal and not tribal courts.
Tribal law governs general tribal elections, and federal courts generally
do not have jurisdiction over these matters. Although the federal
government has established a strong policy against interfering with tribal
governmental matters, there are times when the federal government is
39. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
40. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 289 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis 2005) [hereinafter COHEN].
41. Id.
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Indian Reorganization Act § 16, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2006)).
46. ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 513 (5th ed. 2005).
47. COHEN, supra note 40, at 292.
48. Id. at 293.
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forced to intervene in tribal non-secretarial elections.49  The federal
government is often asked to decide an election's outcome, which may in
turn decide who is the legitimate tribal representative for the purpose of
interactions with the federal government.50 But just as ICRA did not create
jurisdiction for federal courts to hear violations of individual rights, it also
did not create jurisdiction for federal courts to hear violations regarding
tribal elections."
Most tribes have some form of established process for disputing election
results.52 Indeed, this is usually the fact upon which most federally
appealed cases are decided. For instance, Wheeler v. United States
Department of the Interior asked whether the DOI had "[the] authority to
interfere in a tribal election dispute when the tribe provides administrative
and judicial procedures for contesting its elections."5  A candidate
protested the final election results for the Cherokee Nation's Principal
Chief.54 The candidate filed a motion with the Cherokee Tribal Election
Committee.55  In the motion, the candidate requested that the votes be
recounted, that a runoff be held, and that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation conduct an investigation for election fraud.56 The requests
were dismissed and the candidate went to the Cherokee Judicial Appeal
Tribunal.57 An appeal to the Tribunal led to a recount, which confirmed the
existing vote totals. The Tribunal refused the other requests of a revote or
to stay the winner's certification.59 The candidate then took his complaints
to the Superintendent of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the DOI,
both of which found that the "tribal government was functioning within the
scope of its power and, thus, the Department was obligated to recognize the
tribal court decisions rendered in [the] matter." 60
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the "established right to self-
government limits the authority of the [DOI] to resolve tribal election
49. Id.
50. Wheeler v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 811 F.2d 549, 552 (10th Cir. 1987).
51. Wheeler v. Swimmer, 835 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1987).
52. COHEN, supra note 40, at 293.











disputes."6 ' The court further stated that the policy of the U.S. government
62
encourages tribal self-governance, as evidenced in congressional actions.
The court qualified, however, that the DOI can take action in certain
instances, including when "a tribe's constitution or its statutes call for the
[DOI] to take an active role in lawmaking," or when federal law mandates
that the DOI can intervene.6 3 Because the DOI is tasked with interacting
with Indian tribes, there may be times when it has to decide whether entities
within a tribe are the legitimate representatives of the tribe. 4 The DOI's
ultimate decision, though, must nonetheless comply with federal policies of
tribal sovereignty and independence. 65 The court concluded that "when a
tribal forum exists for resolving a tribal election dispute," the DOI cannot
intervene without a federal statute granting authority.66 The court, however,
stopped short of stating that the DOI should intervene whenever there is no
67
entity designated to resolve election issues.
United States v. Pawnee Business Council 8 involved state court
authority to decide tribal election disputes. This case arose when an ousted
69
member of the Pawnee Business Council sought a declaratory judgment.
The ousted member brought suit in Oklahoma state court.70  The tribal
business council fought the state suit in federal district court, and the
federal court found that state courts, like federal courts, "are without
jurisdiction to entertain and decide internal Indian tribal affairs, matters or
disputes." 7 ' The court maintained that Congress possesses the authority to
intervene in these matters, and that Congress has given the Secretary of the
Interior the authority to do so.72
Goodface v. Grassrope73 asked whether a district court could properly
review the BIA's decision to refuse recognition of a tribal council after an
election. The Eighth Circuit found that pursuant to the Administrative
61. Id at 550-51.
62. Id at 551.
63. Id at 551-52.
64. Id at 552.
65. Id
66. Id. at 553.
67. Id
68. 382 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Okla. 1974).
69. Id. at 57.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 58.
72. Id.
73. 708 F.2d 335, 338 (8th Cir. 1983).
No. 2] 431
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Procedure Act,74 federal courts could review the actions of agencies. The
court held, however, that district courts cannot address the merits of an
election dispute if adequate tribal remedies exist. 7 5 The federal court can
order the BIA to conditionally recognize a legitimate entity to represent the
tribe while tribal remedies are being sought within the structure of the tribal
system, but this can only be done "when it is necessary [in order for the
BIA] to carry out its statutory and regulatory obligations."77
Controversies not only arise out of elections, but also out of referenda.
Instead of voting for tribal candidates, a referendum is generally a vote to
change a law or some other tribal policy.78 One example can be found in
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma v. Norton.79 Here, a dispute arose out of a
referendum election involving amendments to the Tribe's constitution.so
Some of the amendments were aimed at excluding certain tribal members
of African ancestry from tribal membership.8' The DOI Assistant Secretary
wrote a letter to the Tribe indicating that the federal government would not
recognize any of the amendments creating the membership exclusion.82
The Tribe filed suit against the DOI, alleging that the agency did not have
the power to review amendments to the Tribe's constitution. While this
suit awaited judgment, the Tribe conducted elections for Principal Chief
and Assistant Chief pursuant to the disputed constitutional amendments.84
The district court issued a ruling stating that the DOI did indeed have
"authority, pursuant to [the tribal constitution], to approve amendments" to
the Tribe's constitution.
Further, the DOI had been granted congressional authority to review
amendments that would affect the determination of tribal chief.86 Acting on
the decision of the district court, the BIA refused to recognize the newly
elected officials until those members that were denied citizenship by the
74. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1982).
75. Goodface, 708 F.2d at 338.
76. Id. at 339.
77. Wheeler v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 811 F.2d 549, 552 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing
Goodface, 708 F.2d at 339).
78. Hario v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1146 (D.D.C. 1976).






85. Id. at 126.




constitutional amendments were reinstated.87 The BIA sent a letter to the
Tribe stating that until the excluded members were added to the rolls and
tribal positions were returned to their pre-election status, the BIA would not
have a governmental relationship with the Tribe.
The Tribe appealed this decision to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 89 The district court held that while concepts of
self-governance and sovereignty must be respected, the DOI "'has the
authority to interpret the tribal constitution in order to determine who will
be recognized as the tribal representative for the purpose of carrying out
federal relations."' 90 Further, because Congress gives the BIA, as trustee,
the duty of facilitating a government-to-government relationship with
tribes, the BIA is obligated to review tribal constitutions.91 Also, "the DOI
has the authority and responsibility to ensure that the Nation's
representatives, with whom it must conduct government-to-government
relations, are the valid representatives of the Nation as a whole."9 2 Finally,
district courts are allowed to set aside these findings by the DOI and BIA if
they determine that the decisions of the department were "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."93
Ransom v. Babbit?4 is another case arising out of a disputed
referendum. In this case, the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe held an election
to determine if the Tribe should adopt a constitution to replace the existing
Three Chief form of government with a traditional democratic government
composed of three branches, similar to the United States form of
government.9 6 The referendum failed by less than one percent of the vote,
but the existing tribal government certified the election as having passed the
constitutional amendments and installed the new form of government.
This controversial act led to a great deal of fighting within the tribe, and the
litigation ultimately found its way to the United States District Court for the
87. Seminole Nation, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 132 (citation omitted).
91. Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
92. Id. at 140.
93. Id. at 147.
94. 69 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.C.C. 1999).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 143.
97. Id.
No. 2] 433
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District of Columbia, based on the BIA's refusal to acknowledge any
government other than the form that existed before the initial referendum. 98
Here again, the court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard. 99
This case also reinforced the idea that the BIA may review tribal
constitutions to determine which party is the legitimate representative of the
tribe. 00 The court stated, however, that "if the legitimate tribal institutions
are no longer functioning or are no longer able to fulfill their duties, the
power to make such important determinations for the tribe in question lies
with the people of the tribe - not with the [federal] government."' 0 '
Finally, the court ruled that the BIA should favor tribal self-governance,
even when doing so would leave tribes with forms of government without
constitutions.10 2
Tribal disputes have led to "[a]n enormous amount of litigation over the
election of tribal officials . . . in tribal courts, and even occasionally in
federal courts, despite the fact that federal courts almost never have
jurisdiction over those suits.',103 While it is true that the federal government
can step in and help resolve issues in limited circumstances, the notions of
self-governance indicate that many solutions to electoral problems must
come from within the tribes. Even when the courts have the power to
intervene, the remedies they craft may not provide permanent solutions to
tribal election disputes. These changes from within the tribes could take
many forms, including amending tribal election procedures, adopting more
efficient dispute resolution processes, or providing increased openness and
transparency in the tribal election process.
B. Tribal Court Remedies for Election Disputes
While the federal court remedies for tribal election disputes are generally
very limited, the potential tribal court remedies are diverse. Tribes often
have their own statutes, customary law, or constitutions that lay out
procedures for elections.'0 A majority of tribes have committees or
judicial bodies that govern election operations.'0o These bodies are also
generally tasked with addressing disputes arising within the election
98. Id. at 147 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).
99. Id. at 149.
100. Id. at 151.
101. Id. at 150.
102. Id.
103. MATTHEw L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 271 (2011).





process.10 6 Parties may seek appeal in the tribal court system once they
have exhausted available election board remedies.'o7 The remedies that are
available to tribal courts are statutory and vary from tribe to tribe. 08 Under
the tribal codes, there are many distinctions between the election boards'
power and the scope of the tribal courts' judicial review authority.
Some tribal codes give almost no judicial review power to the tribal
courts to resolve election disputes. In Darden v. Chitimacha Election
Board, the Chitimacha Tribal Court of Appeals determined that it did not
have jurisdiction to review a decision made by the tribal election board.' 09
The tribal code stated that when election conflicts arise, "[t]he Election
Board will hear the dispute and render a decision, and notify the Tribal
Council. The Election Board is the final decision on appeals.""o The
appellate court affirmed the lower court's dismissal because it determined
that the election board's ruling was final."' Many tribes make election
board decisions final, but allow courts to intervene when there are
"allegations of impropriety by the Election Board."" 2 The rule adopted by
the Eastern Band of Cherokees states that "election results are presumed
valid.""'3 Before the court may intervene, a challenger must show "that the
alleged irregularities unfairly and improperly or illegally affected the actual
outcome of the election or that, but for the alleged irregularities, the
outcome of the election would have been different."l14 This "but for"
standard is difficult to prove, and the court's hands are tied unless the
challenger satisfies it."'
Burdens of proof in election litigation also vary among tribes."'6 The
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma requires that "election challengers bear the
burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged violations
106. Id.
107. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 286 (citing Begay v. Navajo Nation Election Admin.,
N. SC-CV-27-02, 8 Navajo Rptr. 241 (Navajo July 31, 2002)).
108. COHEN, supra note 40, at 288.
109. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 273 (citing Darden v. Chitimacha Election Bd., No.
CV-00-0075, 28 Indian L. Rep. 6043 (Chitimacha Ct. App. Feb. 2, 2001)).
110. Id. at 272 (citing CHITIMACHA CODE tit. X, § 519 (2009)).
111. Id. (citing Darden, 28 Indian L. Rep, 6043).
112. GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS CONST. art VII, § 5(a)-
(c).
113. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 273.
114. CHEROKEE CODE § 161-16(d) (2010).
115. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 273.
116. Id. at 273-74.
No. 2]1 435
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had a strong likelihood of affecting the outcome."I17 Other tribes impose a
"clear and convincing evidence" standard."' Some tribal courts review
election disputes de novo, but will not reexamine the election boards'
findings of fact." 9 When tribal courts are required to show such deference
to election boards, it can impair the courts' ability to grant relief.120
Even when tribal courts have the power to grant relief, the available
remedies may differ among tribes.12 1 Some of these remedies can be highly
disruptive to the tribal government.122 When new elections or recounts are
ordered, it extends the amount of time that the previous leadership remains
in power. This creates a holdover government, which may not be
recognized by the federal government.
Chamberlain v. Peters23 illustrates the problems caused by holdover
governments. The case involved council elections for the Saginaw
Chippewa Tribe of Michigan. Here, a ten-member council (the
Chamberlain Council) took office in November, 1995.124 As the
Chamberlain Council's term approached its end, the Tribe held a new
primary election in which only four members of the Chamberlain Council
were retained.125  For indeterminate reasons, the election results were
disputed and the Chamberlain Council threw out the results.12 6 The Tribe
held a new election, which had similar results, and the Chamberlain
Council again threw them out.127  Following the second election, the
Chamberlain Council's office term ended.12 8 A two-year holdover period
117. Id. at 274 (citing Byrd v. Cherokee Nation Election Comm'n, 8 Okla. Trib. 172, 178
(Okla. Trib. 2003)).
118. See, e.g., Bailey v. Grand Traverse Band Election Bd., No. 2008-1031-CV-CV,
2008 WL 6196206, at *4 (Grand Traverse Trib. Jud. Aug. 8, 2008).
119. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 274; Yellow Bird v. Three Affiliated Tribes Tribal
Election Bd., 29 Indian L. Rep. 6018, 6019 (Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation Dist. Ct. Sept. 27, 2001).
120. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 274.
121. Compare Bailey, 2008 WL 6196206, at *16 (new election ordered), with
Ducheneaux v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Election Bd., 26 Indian L. Rep. 6155
(Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Ct. App. 1999) (injunction denied because remedies available
through the election board were not exhausted). See FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 281.
122. FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 281.
123. Chamberlain v. Peters, 27 Indian L. Rep. 6085 (Saginaw Chippewa Tribe of Mich.
Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2000); FLETCHER, supra note 103, at 308-17.








began, which involved litigation in the tribal courts and additional rounds of
elections.12 9 At one point, the BIA threatened that if valid elections were
not held within a given time period, the federal government would no
longer recognize the Chamberlain Council, and dealings with the Tribe
would take place through another council that had won an off-reservation
election during the holdover period.'3 0 The holdover council ignored this
directive, and the BIA found itself in the awkward position of choosing the
Tribe's properly elected representative.' 3 '
The Chamberlain case demonstrates the difficulties of applying tribal
remedies to election disputes. The tribal entity charged with validating an
election is often a participant in the election, creating conflicts of interest
and the appearance of impropriety. There are many possible solutions
tribes can adopt to prevent or remedy these election issues.
One solution is to analyze state or foreign election codes to identify
potential changes to tribal codes that could help to prevent these problems.
These election code changes could come from the tribes themselves, or
Congress could mandate them. Because Congress retains plenary power
over Indian tribes, it could force tribes to adopt a model election code that it
deems best suited to address the problems causing election disputes.
Congress could also take an approach similar to the Help American Vote
Act by providing tribes with financial incentives to update their voting
procedures to conform to some set standard. This, however, would go
against Congress's stated policy of encouraging tribes to establish their own
laws and forms of government.
IV Models for Election Reform
A. Existing Procedural Remedies
Election disputes can arise in many ways. Some frequent causes are
fraud, mistake, non-fraudulent misconduct, or extrinsic events. 132  To
address these situations, governments have adopted various remedies,
including recounts, adjusting vote totals, and holding new elections.
There are two types of recounts: automatic and requested.133 Automatic
recounts occur when final election results fall within a certain statutorily
129. Id.
130. Id. at 6087.
131. Id. at 6088.
132. Huefner, Election Wrongs, supra note 3, at 271-77.
133. Id. at 278.
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defined margin. Requested recounts occur at the request of one of the
candidates or some other statutorily defined individual. 13 4
Recounts often involve the issue of how to determine voter intent when it
is not clear from the ballot. In Bush v. Gore, for instance, the election's
results turned on the standard used to determine which ballots should be
included, applying the same standard across all counties in Florida."'s
In a tribal election, it is necessary that the election code set out exactly
which ballots should be included and which should be thrown out. This is
particularly important if a tribe counts votes in more than one location, so
that all ballots receive the same treatment. Even if a small tribe conducts
voting in only one location, it must nevertheless establish clear, specific
standards to determine which ballots are counted. This can quickly resolve
disputes arising out of voter mistake and unreadable ballots, and it ensures
that the same standards apply in all elections.
A similar issue arises when the total number of votes for a candidate is
adjusted.13 6 This adjustment can occur in two ways. First, when specific
ballots are determined to be invalid. 13 7 Second, when the final totals are
determined to be incorrect but no invalid ballots are found.13 1 In the first
case, the tainted ballots can simply be thrown out and the final results
adjusted.139 "[W]hen the tainted votes cannot be specifically identified ...
the proper remedy is less clear" and generally depends on whether the
tainted total exceeds the margin of victory.140 The remedies can include
throwing out all absentee ballots, leaving out all ballots cast at the precinct
in question, or holding a new election.14 1  These remedies are often
undesirable, however, because they have the effect of disenfranchising a
particular group of voters.142
Like recounts, the critical factor for changing voting results is to have a
strict set of standards governing these circumstances detailed in the tribal
election code. This ensures that all votes and elections are carried out under
the same rules and receive equal treatment. Applying the same standards
134. Id.
135. Id. at 290.




140. Id. at 281.
141. Id. at 281-82.




across multiple elections increases the perceived legitimacy of the process
and prevents votes from being arbitrarily discounted.
When election results cannot be determined, courts are often forced to
decide whether new elections should be held and whether courts have the
authority to call new elections. 14 3  The courts' decisions in these
circumstances may depend on whether the margin of victory exceeds the
number of votes in question.'"
In state election codes, there may be little guidance on when a new
election can be called.14 5 Tribal election codes are often similarly vague.146
Some tribes give wide discretion to courts to establish procedures to settle
these disputes. For instance, the Absentee Shawnee Code states:
In the event that any person who is party to an election dispute or
contest and that person is not satisfied with the Election
Commissioner's decision, then that party may appeal the
Election Commissioner's decision to the Tribal Court under such
rules and regulations as the judicial branch may prescribe.147
Without specific guidelines to follow, the courts may be forced to make
the rules up as they go along. Settling these disputes without established
guidelines may create the appearance of impropriety. The criteria for
runoffs, re-votes, and candidate disqualifications should be firmly decided
at the outset of an election to prevent voter disenfranchisement and
dissatisfaction.
When considering implementing new election procedures, one must
weigh cost and efficiency.14 8 One must balance any increased costs with
the increase in legitimacy.14 9 Further, one must also consider the length of
time a given procedure might add to the voting or recount process.15 0
It can be difficult to implement changes to election procedures.
"Institutional reform is an inherently difficult task.""' Like other
143. Id. at 283.
144. Id. at 284.
145. Id. at 287; see also Mo.REV. STAT. § 115.593 (2006).
146. See, e.g., PAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA LAW AND ORDER CODE tit. VIll (2005).
147. ABSENTEE SHAWNEE CODE art. XII § 4.
148. Huefner, Election Wrongs, supra note 3, at 293-94.
149. Id. at 294.
150. Id.
151. Eric Lemont, Developing Effective Processes ofAmerican Indian Constitutional and
Governmental Reform: Lessons from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Haulapai Nation,
Navajo Nation, and Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 147, 165 (2001-
2002).
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governments, Indian nations often unsuccessfully attempt to adopt reforms
several times before the measures ultimately pass.152 During this period,
several elections may take place and elected officials spearheading the
reform may be replaced. Indeed, these issues may not be seriously
considered until there is an election crisis visible or controversial enough to
push the reforms forward. 53
B. Domestic Models for Reform
Tribes have already adopted many of the reforms adopted by state and
local governments: "American Indian nations have made numerous
constitutional revisions to their election procedures. One of the most
frequent reforms has been to adopt primary elections . . . . Other areas of
reform have focused on voter eligibility disputes arising out of the
residency and enrollment status of tribal members."S 4 But because many
of the standard approaches to election dispute resolutions have been found
undesirable, some scholars suggest that we look abroad for other
alternatives.
Following Bush v. Gore, a large amount of scholarship focused on how
local, state, and federal elections can avoid disputes. The suggestions found
therein include standardized voter registration across all states, non-partisan
election commissions, and encouraging courts to get involved in pre-
election instead of post-election litigation.'5 5 Many of these suggestions are
not viable for tribal elections because of inherent differences between tribal
and non-tribal elections.
Regarding the first suggestion, tribes take varying approaches to voter
registration. Some tribes have no registration process and allow any
member of requisite age to participate in elections.'56  Others require
registration with an election secretary or tribal registrar to be eligible to
vote.'57  In comparison to non-tribal voting registration, tribal voting
registration rarely entails residency issues. States differ in their
requirements for registration, which can often lead to confusion for both
voters and officials when voters have recently moved to a new state or
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 164.
155. Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937, 945 (2005).
156. E.g., PAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA LAW AND ORDER CODE tit. VIII, § 5(A) (2005).




precinct. 58 Tribes generally do not experience the same voter registration
problems because tribes have fewer polling places and the eligibility to vote
is generally based on tribal membership and not residence.
One problem that may arise with tribal voter registration is when a tribe
member does not realize that registration is a requirement for voting.
Commenting on a recent tribal election, one election monitor observed that
there are times when "citizens [do] not appear to understand that the
process of voter registration and registration as a tribal citizen were two
distinct processes." 59 If this is a recurring theme within a tribe, the tribal
government may need to foster better education for its citizens regarding its
voting laws and procedures.
As to the second suggestion, unbiased election commissions cannot
necessarily prevent election disputes from initially occurring, but they can
certainly provide more legitimacy to the process once the dispute arises.
"To the extent possible, the people running [] elections should not have a
vested interest in their outcome."6 o
Tribes do not have issues of partisanship in election commissions since
tribes do not have political parties. But the lack of partisanship does not
mean that the commissions are necessarily immune from bias. Tribes vary
in the way election boards are determined; however, they are usually
appointed either by a government body or an elected official. 161
Appointments can lead to perceived or actual bias in favor of those who
appointed the election commission officials. It is possible that this may
never be completely avoided. Nevertheless, there are ways to improve the
process. One suggestion is for the executive branch to appoint the election
officials who must then seek approval by a legislative super-majority.
This may not always be possible in some tribes because governmental
structures vary greatly.
The third suggestion for preventing election disputes is to change the
timing of the election-related litigation.16 3 These changes are not always
possible because some of the issues that create the disputes do not arise
158. Hasen, supra note 155, at 964-65.
159. Press Release, Carter Center, The Carter Center Congratulates the Cherokee Nation
on the Completion of the Vote Counting Process (Oct. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Carter Press
Release 1], available at http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/cherokee-nation- 101411 .html.
160. Hasen, supra note 155, at 974.
161. See, e.g., WHITE MOUNTAIN APACHE TRIBE ELECTION CODE ch. 2, § 2.1(A) (2001).
162. Hasen, supra note 155, at 983-84.
163. Id. at 991.
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until the election is underway.'6 When possible, however, courts might be
better served by involving themselves early in the election cycle process.
"A court asked to decide a question of statutory or constitutional law that
affects the outcome of an already held election is injected in the worst way
into the political thicket."165 The court interjection inevitably leads to the
public and media alike questioning the court's motives and biases.166 When
the parties can settle issues before the election takes place, the problems of
perceived impropriety may be avoided or substantially lessened.
There are many problems with the existing remedies available to tribes to
settle election disputes. Some of them are not practical or necessary for
tribes to adopt, and even those that are may still be inadequate. Most of the
remedies do not necessarily prevent drawn-out legal battles. Indeed,
remedies found in codes such as that of the Absentee Shawnee, discussed
supra, send these disputes directly to the courts. The judicial process is not
necessarily undesirable for dispute resolution, but prolonged litigation is
expensive and may leave tribes without recognized leaders for extended
periods. Even those remedies that tribes successfully adopt may only act to
bolster the appearance of legitimacy and may not actually prevent the root
of the controversy.
C. International Models
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the United States has played
an important role in the global rise in democracy. In this process,"[w]e
have tried to export U.S. election laws and procedures to just about every
corner of the world, and . .. some of those countries do not appreciate that
because they say we still have yet to figure it out."'67 Just as some other
countries have found the American election model undesirable, tribes may
wish to look beyond the United States' borders for models to resolve
election disputes.
There is a great deal of diversity among the methods of election dispute
resolution used internationally. Just as individual tribal governments vary
greatly, governments across the world vary in their composition. As such,
164. Id. at 993.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Steven F. Huefner, What Can the United States Learn from Abroad About Resolving
Disputed Elections?, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 535-36 (2010) (quoting David





no singular system may be best for all tribes as no singular system is best
for every country.
The most noticeable difference between dispute resolution systems is
which body holds the power to resolve .the disputes. This authority may
rest in one of four different groups, depending on the system: traditional
courts, legislatures, special tribunals, or ad hoc bodies.s16
Courts of general jurisdiction are a popular choice foi resolving election
disputes because they are perceived as neutral.'69 This neutrality, however,
may not always be the case. In the tribal context, it would be necessary to
consider how the court is appointed. If elected by the tribe at large, these
judges may very well be neutral. But if tribal executives or legislatures
appoint these judges, then from a neutrality standpoint, they may not be the
best choice to settle election disputes because they could appear loyal to
those candidates who appointed them.
Another approach is to allow legislatures to decide electoral disputes.o7 0
This is how ties in the Electoral College are decided in the United States.17 1
This system is becoming less popular in democracies across the world
because of neutrality concerns.172 "This disfavor reflects concern about
both the self-interest of the adjudicating legislators . .. and the fact that this
approach simply lets the legislative majority pick the winners . . . rather
than [reaching] a fair or neutral outcome." 7 3
A third approach is to allow special electoral tribunals to adjudicate
election disputes.174 These bodies offer the same promises of neutrality as
courts of general jurisdiction, but may provide increased perceptions of
legitimacy because of their independence and experience in adjudicating
election disputes.175 An additional advantage is that these bodies prevent
courts of general jurisdiction from becoming involved in political
questions.16 This system "permits the judges to have greater expertise,"
but may not be necessary unless there is a caseload large enough to require
the court to be permanent. 7 7
168. Id. at 538.
169. Id. at 539.
170. Id. at 540.
171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XII.
172. Hueffner, Resolving Disputed Elections, supra note 167, at 540.
173. Id. at 545.
174. Id. at 541.
175. Id. at 547.
176. Id. at 548.
177. Robert A. Pastor, Improving the U.S. Electoral System: Lessons from Canada and
Mexico, 3 ELECTION L.J. 584, 587 (2004).
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When possible, the special electoral tribunal approach appears to be the
best choice for tribes. There are clear advantages of neutrality over the
legislative model. Further, special electoral tribunals prevent courts of
general jurisdiction from getting involved in political questions. If the
members of these special tribunals can be chosen in a way that would
prevent any actual or perceived allegiances to the parties involved in the
election dispute, then this may very well be the best choice for tribal
election dispute adjudication. Possible options to determine the
composition of these groups include:
appointment by a legislative supermajority of individuals
meeting certain eligibility standards; joint appointments by
executive and legislative officials; empaneling through a process
akin to jury selection . . ; or ad hoc appointments of a subset of
the tribunal by the principal candidates, with the remainder of
the tribunal to be constituted through the unanimous agreement
of those already appointed. 78
Even when tribes amend election codes and procedures to prevent
disputes and appearances of biases, disputes can still arise. Because no
system can ever prevent all election disputes, a better approach for
governments may be to increase transparency and legitimacy in their
election processes. To that end, large governments, unlike tribes, are at an
advantage when these election disputes arise. The media, competing
political parties, and other "watchdog" organizations already give attention
to the elections in large governments.
To promote transparency, tribes may wish to explore another option that
has become more popular in international elections over the last few
decades: election monitoring. Foreign governments, some tribes, and even
the federal government have used election monitoring, which may provide
an adequate solution for piercing the veil of tribal election disputes.
V Proposal for Tribal Election Reform Through Election Observation
Foreign election monitoring 1 has been around for over 150 years.so
The practice expanded greatly after World War II, initially through the
United Nations (UN).
178. Huefner, Resolving Disputed Elections, supra note 167, at 548.
179. While some researchers illustrate differences between election "monitoring" and




As decolonization accelerated in the 1950-60s, so too did the
UN's "first generation" involvement in founding elections to
ensure they were free and fair. So-called "second generation"
election monitoring missions are more comprehensive and have
become more common with the end of the Cold War and the
growing global consensus on the value of democracy. 8 2
Today, many democracies participate in some form of election
monitoring.8
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) engage in election monitoring.'18 Among the IGOs
that actively monitor elections are the United Nations, the Organization of
American States, the Commonwealth, and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation of Europe.ss Participating NGOs include the Carter
Center, the International Human Rights Law Group, and the Washington
Office on Latin America. 8 6
Election observation plays an important role in the democratic process.
In its guidelines, the Independent National Electoral Commission illustrates
the importance of election monitoring. These guidelines state:
Election observation is undertaken in order to provide an
impartial and accurate assessment of the nature of election
processes for the benefit of the population of the country where
the election is held. It provides opportunity for constructive
criticism and engagement of election process to ensure improved
performance in future elections. It is an expression of interest in
protecting and promoting of common democratic values by
organisations and governments who provide Observers. . . .
[Election observation] provides information on the bases of
which an election process can be analyzed[,] beam[s] the
ELECTIONS AND BUILDING DEMOCRACY 40-42 (2004), these terms are used interchangeably
throughout this article.




183. SUSAN D. HYDE, THE PSEUDO-DEMOCRAT'S DILEMMA: WHY ELECTION
OBSERVATION BECAME AN INTERNATIONAL NORM 206 (2011).
184. ARTURO SANTA-CRUZ, INTERNATIONAL ELECTION MONITORING, SOVEREIGNTY, AND




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
spotlight on the electoral process and discourages malpractices[,]
is a learning process and provides comparative information to
assist other countries in improving their electoral process[,] helps
the observed state to identify mistakes and recognise progress[,]
reinforces common standards and universal benchmarks on what
elections should be[,] and enhances transparency and reinforces
the integrity and credibility of the election process."'
Moreover, studies show that the mere presence of election observers at
polling stations can deter election fraud.'88 Election observation provides
increased legitimacy and transparency, and increases the likelihood that the
process is carried out in a democratic way.
A. 2011 Cherokee Nation Principal ChiefElection Case Study
An example of these aspects of election monitoring can be seen in the
Carter Center's monitoring of the 2011 Cherokee Nation election.' 90 The
presence of a third party observer provided much-needed transparency in
the election process. Through this observation, the Carter Center was also
able to make recommendations for changes to the Cherokee Nation's
election code that would make their election process more fair and efficient.
1. 2011 Cherokee Nation Election Dispute
On June 25, 2011, the Cherokee Nation held an election for Principal
Chief.'9 ' This race pitted three-term incumbent Chad "Corntassel" Smith
against three-term tribal council member Bill John Baker.19 2 The unofficial
results on election night showed Baker ahead by 11 votes out of 14,000
cast, but when the Cherokee Nation Election Commission certified the
election the next day, it declared Smith the winner by seven votes.193
Ever present in this election was the issue of the enfranchisement of the
Cherokee Freedmen, who are the descendants of former slaves owned by
members of the Nation. "In March 2007, a referendum - in which only
187. INEC Guidelines for Election Observation, INDEP. NAT'L ELECTORAL COMM'N, 6,
http://www.ng.undp.org/dgd/INEC-Guidelines-Observation.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
188. HYDE, supra note 183, at 206.
189. BJORNLUND, supra note 179, at 32-33.
190. Carter Press Release I, supra note 159.
191. Brian Daffron, Cherokee Elections Continue in Tribal Court, INDIAN COUNTRY







8,700 ballots were cast - denied tribal citizenship to anyone who did not
have at least one ancestor on the 1867 U.S. government's Dawes List of
ethnic Cherokees. Most of the disenfranchised were the nearly 3,000
Cherokee Freedmen."l 94
A January 2011 decision by the District Court of the Cherokee Nation
ruled that this referendum was invalid.'9 5 Because of this decision, the
Freedmen were allowed to participate in the June election.
Meanwhile, on June 28, Baker filed an emergency injunction with the
Cherokee Nation Supreme Court, and his campaign filed a petition for
recount the next day.' 96 A recount was initiated two days later, and the
results showed Baker the winner by 266 votes.19 7 This led Smith to file an
emergency injunction against the election commission and request an
additional recount. 198 Smith alleged that hundreds of ballots had not been
counted and because of this, the previous recounts were flawed.' 99 On July
5, the chair of the election commission resigned, "citing that media outlets
[had] given him a negative public perception during the [] principal chief
election controversy." 2 00
The Cherokee Nation Supreme Court convened on July 8 to hear
arguments from both campaigns.20 ' On July 21, the court issued its
opinion.202 The court ruled that it was "impossible to determine the election
result with mathematical certainty or to certify a successful
candidate .. . .,.203 The results were thrown out, and a new election was
ordered.204
During this time, the Cherokee Nation Speaker of the Council, Meredith
Frailey, called a special session of the legislative council to discuss ways to
194. John Stremlau, Black Cherokees Exercise Hard-Won Right to Vote, CNN, http://
www.cnn.coml2011/10/19/opinion/stremlau-cherokee-vote/index.html (last updated Oct. 19,
2011).
195. See Order at 3-4, Nash v. Cherokee Nation Registrar, CV-07-40 (Cherokee Dist. Ct.
Jan. 14, 2011).




200. Will Chavez, Election Commission Chairman Resigns Amid Controversy,
CHEROKEEPHOENIX.ORG (July 5, 2011, 2:35 PM), http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/Article/
Index/5037.
201. Daffron, supra note 191.
202. Final Order at 1, In re 2011 General Election, No. SC-2011-06 (Cherokee Nation S.
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prevent future election problems from arising.20 5 One of the suggested
solutions was to invite a third party to observe future elections.206 The
Cherokee Council special session met on July 12, and a resolution was
proposed "calling upon the Cherokee Nation Election Commission to
obtain an independent election service organization to observe future
election processes."207
Candidate Baker, a member of the council, offered an amendment to the
resolution to allow representatives from each campaign to view recounts in
20820future elections. This amendment passed.209  The council then
considered whether the BIA should be invited to observe future elections.2 10
An amendment was suggested to specifically exclude the BIA from the list
of possible groups to be invited to observe elections, but this amendment
was determined to be too specific.21 1 The final resolution passed 9-8, with
Candidate Baker and Speaker Frailey, who initially called for the meeting,
voting against its final passage.212 It should be noted that at the time of this
meeting, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court had not yet invalidated the
previous general election, so the council members could not be completely
certain whether any rule changes they passed would affect the ongoing
election dilemma.
Further changes to the election code were set to be considered at another
session of the Cherokee Nation's council on August 5, but a quorum could
not be obtained because six members of the council boycotted the
213meeting. Among the boycotting members were Baker and Joe
Crittenden.2 14 A week later, Crittenden would be sworn in as Deputy Chief
205. Cherokee Nation's Special Rules Committee to Meet to Discuss Smoother Elections,
NATIVE NEWS NETWORK (July 8, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.nativenewsnetwork.com/
cherokee-nations-special-rules-committee-to-meet-to-discuss-smoother-elections.html.
206. Id.
207. Meeting Minutes, Council of the Cherokee Nation Rules Committee (July 12, 2011)
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of the Nation, and would serve as acting Chief until the election dispute was
settled and a new Chief elected.215
On the agenda was a change to the way that absentee ballots would be
distributed in the upcoming revote between Baker and Smith, which by now
216had been ordered by the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court. Instead of
only going to those who requested the absentee ballots, they would be sent
to all registered at-large citizens.217 This change had been proposed at a
Rules Committee meeting a week earlier, but failed to get the requisite
votes. 2 1 8 "[T]he boycotting councilors called the meeting a desperate last
act by Principal Chief Chad Smith to change election laws to 'move votes
to his column."' 219 Another action on the agenda that had to be tabled
because of lack of quorum was adding a new member to the election
220commission.
Citing the Cherokee people's right to define tribal citizenship, on August
22, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court overturned the district court's
January ruling that had allowed the Freedmen to participate in the general
election.22 1 Prior to this ruling, about 1,200 Freedmen descendants were
registered to vote.222 In response to this ruling, the Freedmen filed a
preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.223 The injunction asked the court to prevent the DOI from
recognizing the results of any tribal elections in which the Freedmen were
not allowed to participate.224 As a result, "[t]he U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development withheld a $33 million disbursement and
the [BIA] said it would not recognize results of an upcoming election for
215. Will Chavez, Elected leaders Sworn In at Inauguration Ceremony,
CHEROKEEPHOENIX.ORG (Aug. 17, 2001, 12:16 PM), http://www.cherokeephoenix.org/
Article/Index/5423.





221. Cherokee Nation Registrar v. Nash, No. SC-2011-02, at 9 (Cherokee Nation Sup.
Ct. Aug. 22, 2011).
222. Lenzy Krehbiel-Burton, Cherokee Freedmen Ask Court to Reinstate Rights, TULSA
WORLD (Sept. 4, 2011, 2:40 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=
11&articleid=20110904 11 A22 TheChe818925.
223. See generally Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Vann v. Salazar, No.
1:03cv01711 (HHK), 2011 WL 4953030 (D.D.C. Sept. 2,2011).
224. Id. at 1.
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tribal principal chief because of the membership issue." 225 Meanwhile, the
new election was scheduled for September 24, 201 1.226
On September 20, acting Chief Crittenden entered into an agreement
with the D.C. District Court and the representatives of the Freedmen to
227
allow the Freedmen to participate in the new election. This was
incorporated into an injunction order and taken to Cherokee courts to be
filed as a foreign judgment.228 The injunction
included amendments to the voters roll to reinstate eligible,
registered Freedmen on the list; the mailing of absentee ballots
to Freedmen voters; the addition of in-person voting days for
Freedmen voters from Sept. 24-Oct. 8; and most significantly for
election day, a delay of the vote counting process until the week
of Oct. 9, 2011.229
The election period began as scheduled and ballot-counting for the
second election began on October 9.230 The next day, the Cherokee Nation
Supreme Court announced that it would not recognize the federal
injunction.231 After the final votes were tallied, Baker was declared the
winner by almost 1,600 votes.232 Based on the Freedmen's participation
and the extended voting period, Smith filed his final appeal in the.Cherokee
Nation Supreme Court, but it was dismissed on October 19.233
225. Steve Olafson, Cherokee Tribe Retreats from Effort to Oust Some Members,
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2011, 2:26 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/15/us-usa-
cherokees-idUSTRE78E5IX20110915.
226. Good Voice, supra note 213.
227. Order Striking Filing at 1, Vann v. Salazar, No. SC- 1l-07 (Cherokee Nation Sup.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2011).
228. Id.
229. Press Release, Carter Center, Carter Center Commends Successful Cherokee Nation
Voting Day and Highlights the Need for Patience and Transparency as Process Unfolds
(Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Carter Press Release II], available at http://www.cartercenter.
org/news/pr/cherokeenation-092711 .html.
230. Linzy Krehbiel-Burton, Smith Challenges Cherokee Election Results, TULSA
WORLD (Oct. 18, 2011, 2:26 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?
subjectid=1 1&articleid=20111018_12_AlCUTLIN13607.
231. Vann v. Salazar, No. 1:03cv01711 (HHK), 2011 WL 4953030, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept.
2, 2011).
232. Krehbiel-Burton, supra note 230.
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2. Carter Center Observation
On September 14, 2011, the Carter Center issued a press release
announcing that it had accepted an invitation from the Cherokee Nation
Election Commission to observe the Principal Chief election on September
24.234 The Carter Center is a nongovernmental organization founded by
235former President Jimmy Carter, and his wife, Rosalynn Carter. Among
its stated missions is monitoring elections in developing democracies across
the globe.236 The Carter Center had previously monitored the 1999
Cherokee elections.237 The Carter Center stated that it "normally observe[s]
elections only in politically troubled countries abroad but believe[d] that the
contentiousness and fundamental voting rights issues at stake - and not
just for the Cherokees -justified this exceptional mission."238
The Carter Center observed all aspects of the September 24 election.
This included monitoring the precinct polling staff, overseeing voter
registration and identification, appointing poll watchers for each candidate,
implementing the extended voting period, and supervising the ballot
counting.2 39 The Carter Center released two reports of its observations.
The first pertained to election day activities. 240 The second pertained to
vote counting and the extended voting period. 24 1 There were no reports of
major incidents.242 The Carter Center also made a number of suggestions
for future elections, including adopting a set of clear guidelines for the
rejection of contested ballots.243 Finally, and most importantly, the
presence of the neutral third party provided legitimacy and transparency to
244the voting and vote-counting process.
234. Press Release, Carter Center, Carter Center Announces Election Observation
Mission to Cherokee Nation (Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Carter Press Release III], available
at http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/cherokee-nation-091411 .html.
235. The Carter Center has Observed 92 Elections in 37 Countries, CARTER CENTER,
http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
236. Id.
237. Carter Press Release III, supra note 234.
238. Stremlau, supra note 194.
239. Carter Press Release II, supra note 229.
240. Id.
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3. Cherokee Election Analyzed
Some of the roots of the Cherokee election dispute are problems that
many tribes may face. They are also problems that can be addressed
through constitutional or election code reforms. But even changes to these
laws may not provide a palatable remedy to election disputes because of the
nature of tribal governments.
One problem was that the initial vote-counting took place behind closed
doors and without the level of transparency that leads to trust in the political
system. Election codes can be amended to allow more access to candidates
and their representatives. Transparency can also be achieved by allowing
neutral third-party monitoring organizations more access to the ballot-
counting process.
Another issue with the Cherokee election was the administrative roles
that both candidates played in the election's execution and in determining
the rules that would guide the election. As one figure at the Carter Center
noted,
In August, before the rerun, the Cherokee Supreme Court issued
a second ruling, affirming that the March referendum was
constitutional. Smith had championed the 2007 referendum and,
not surprisingly, praised the affirmation of Supreme Court,
whose members he had appointed. Because of that, many
believed the court ruling was rooted more in political
opportunism - to assure more votes for Smith over Baker -
than legal principles.2 4 5
It also leads to the appearance of impropriety when election candidates
propose and vote on procedural changes that would affect the election in
which they are running, as with the special session held by the Cherokee
Council.
The issues of perceived impropriety are more difficult to address. Tribes
are given the difficult task of fielding a government large enough to ensure
an appropriate balance of power and proper checks and balances out of a
relatively small population. Even the Cherokee Tribe, which is one of the
largest Indian tribes, must form a fully functioning government with
roughly half the population of a United States congressional district. It may
be impossible to avoid situations of apparent biases because of the nature of
small governments. But the presence of neutral third-party observers may




provide adequate reassurances to tribal members that no improper activities
have occurred when these situations arise.
This transparency is precisely what the Carter Center provided by
monitoring the Cherokee elections. Through its presence during the voting
and vote-counting procedures, the Carter Center fostered a level of trust in
the democratic process that was missing in the previous election. As the
Carter Center affirmed, there were no instances of impropriety throughout
the reelection.246 But without the presence of the neutral third party, there
would have been no way to verify that all votes were given equal treatment
and that the tribal election code was applied evenly and accurately.
B. Election Observation as a Solution to Tribal Election Disputes
Election monitoring is the best option for tribes to remedy election
disputes. Election monitoring provides a level of transparency and
legitimacy that cannot be obtained with other modes of election reform.
Allowing a neutral party to have access to the election procedures increases
public trust in the voting process, deters election fraud, and allows the
monitors to suggest further reforms to the election process to aid in future
elections. Moreover, although the appearance of conflicts of interest and
biases may be unavoidable because of the size and structure of tribal
governments, the presence of a neutral third party to monitor the actions of
the accused individuals may provide comfort to those concerned.
There are two options available to tribes wishing to invite a third party to
observe their elections. The first is to allow observation from an already
existing NGO. An example of this is the Carter Center's monitoring of the
Cherokee elections. Generally, these NGOs will not monitor elections
unless they have been invited by the government.
The second option is for tribes to establish their own election-monitoring
IGO, composed of representatives from participating member tribes. The
IGO could be created by an already existing tribal organization, such as the
National Congress of American Indians, or it could be formed as a new
entity structured only for the purposes of monitoring tribal elections and
protecting the tribal democratic process.
A tribal election monitoring organization would allow tribes to establish
the procedures for election monitoring that work best for tribal elections.
246. Press Release, Carter Center, Carter Center Commends Successful Cherokee Nation
Voting Day and Highlights the Need for Patience and Transparency as Process Unfolds
(Sept. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Carter Press Release IV], available at http://www.
cartercenter.org/news/pr/cherokee nation-0927 11 .html.
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The organization would maintain tribal sovereignty because the tribes
would be the ones establishing the observation guidelines. What is more,
sovereignty would be maintained because tribes would not be forced to join
the organization or to allow election monitors, but would do so only on a
voluntary basis.
Many election-monitoring entities have issued guidelines for how
election monitoring should be conducted. The tribes could use these
guidelines as models. For instance, in 2005 the United Nations issued the
Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code
of Conduct for International Election Observers.247 Twenty-one election-
monitoring organizations endorsed the declaration at the time of its
adoption.248 Using these guidelines as models for establishing standards by
which tribal elections should be monitored would ensure that these
elections are carried out in accordance with internationally accepted
democratic standards. Meeting these standards would lead to increased
perceptions of legitimacy among the general public.
The makeup of a tribal election IGO could be determined in a number of
ways. One possibility is for each member tribe to send a representative to
the organization. The tribes could also recruit experienced academics or
leaders in the field of election law to participate. This would create a
diverse collection of individuals who could contribute ideas from their
various backgrounds.
There are many additional benefits that would flow from tribal election
monitoring. First, it would increase communication between tribes. This
would allow the various participating tribes to discuss election problems
they have faced in the past and to brainstorm remedies for these problems.
It would also allow people with experience in election monitoring around
the world to contribute to the dialogue. Including election law academics in
the process would grant them access to the tribal election process, which, in
the past, has been rare. There is currently very little research dedicated to
the topic of tribal elections. More access would allow those researchers to
analyze tribal elections and participate in fashioning models to improve the
electoral system.
One important hurdle that a tribal election IGO may have to overcome is
funding. Tribes may be forced to decide whether the IGO would foot the
247. See generally U.N. Electoral Assistance Div., Declaration of Principles for
International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election
Observers, CARTER CENTER, http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2231.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2012).




bill for each monitored election or whether each hosting tribe would pay.
Monitoring elections is certainly not cheap, but such precautionary costs are
far less substantial than the alternative remedial options, such as extended
litigation related to elections and the cost of holding new elections when the
winner of a previous contest cannot be determined.
Election monitoring is not a cure-all for election disputes. The causes of
these disputes can certainly arise even with election observers present.
Some of these causes can also be solved through other means, such as
amending election codes. But the creation of a tribal election monitoring
IGO would increase transparency and legitimacy in the election process,
increase dialogue between tribes so they can learn from each other, lower
the occurrence of extended litigation, and allow access from experienced
outsiders who can participate in meaningful dialogue aimed at solving the
problems of election disputes.
VI. Conclusion
Indian tribes are domestic dependent nations, and as such, Congress
retains plenary power over them. Congress has, however, allowed tribes to
exercise their sovereign power in determining tribal forms of government.
Included in this determination is how to elect tribal leaders. Tribes, just
like other governments across the world, are forced to deal with disputes
concerning the democratic process. These problems are important to
address because election disputes increase distrust in the election process,
and lead to expensive and drawn-out litigation. Disputes can also create the
perception that the ultimate winner is illegitimate.
Electoral systems around the world differ in how they remedy election
disputes. Among the available remedies are recounts, throwing out a
portion of the ballots, holding new elections, and various forms of
injunctive relief. Governments differ in how they adjudicate these disputes.
Some opt for courts of general jurisdiction. Others create special courts or
allow legislatures to settle the disputes.
When election disputes arise in the tribal context, remedies can almost
never be found in state or federal courts. Congress has left the power to
settle these issues to tribal courts. At times, the BIA may be forced to
determine the legitimate leader of a tribe, but the majority of election
disputes remain in tribal courts.
Even within tribal courts, the remedies available may be limited. These
courts are often limited by their tribes' constitutions. Tribal election board
decisions may be final, or, alternatively, the challenger may be required to
satisfy an elevated standard of proof to overturn an election board ruling.
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Many of the typical problems associated with tribal elections can be seen
in the 2011 Cherokee Nation Principal Chief election. This election went
through numerous recounts, one re-vote, and various controversies
associated with alleged conflicts of interest and biases. Midway through
the process, the Nation invited the Carter Center to monitor the election.
Allowing access to the neutral third party provided much-needed
transparency to the election, and helped to ensure that the new election and
vote-counting process complied with the Cherokee election code and
international standards. It also allowed the Carter Center to observe all
aspects of the voting and ballot-counting procedures so that it could
recommend changes to the process that may help prevent future election
disputes.
Election monitoring is the best option for tribes to prevent election
disputes. While no change to the system can ever fix all problems that may
arise in an election, creating a tribal IGO to monitor elections could
increase transparency and legitimacy, deter election fraud, increase idea-
sharing between tribes, and allow access to industry experts who can study
tribal procedures and suggest possible reforms, with input and exchange
from the member tribes' representatives. A tribal IGO would allow tribes
to formulate methods of election monitoring that work best for tribal
elections, while conforming to international standards to ensure that their
citizens can properly exercise their democratic rights in a full and free
manner.
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